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I ')J' :
MONEY, FLEXIBLE PRICES, AND EMPLOYMENT
By Paul Wells
In a highly valuable article published some 28 years
ago, Modigliani reached the rather thundering conclusion
that in Kyenes's General Theory "••• the consistency of economic
equilibrium with the presence of involuntary unemployment...
is due entirely to the assumption of 'rigid wages ,,, [7, p. 265].
Now it would not be an exaggeration to say that with this
one sweeping conclusion Modigliani effectively jeopardized
the entire Keynesian Revolution in economic theory. He
jeopardized the revolution by apparently demonstrating for the
first time how crucially and how uneasily Keynes's system,
in all its uniqueness and all its power, rested on nothing
more than a single institutionally valid but theoretically
unsatisfactory postulate—the postulate of rigid money wages.
Modigliani produced his extremely damaging result by
showing that in a regime of flexible money wages and prices,
the economy would move automatically to a position of full
employment irrespective of whether one utilized the Keynesian
paraphenalia (liquidity preference, consumption function,
aggregate demand, etc.) or the more familiar classical
paraphenalia (money velocities, "rational" economic behavior,
flexible real wages, etc.). Ke then completed his case by
demonstrating that if indeed money wages were rigid, both
the Keynesian and classical modes of analysis are equally
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capable of grinding out less than full employment equilibriums.
With Modigliani 's widely accepted and seemingly inescapable
results well in mind, it then comes as somewhat of a shock to
reread Chapters 2 and 19 of The General Theory [5] and find
Keynes asserting, clearly and uncategorically, that rigid
money wages are not responsible for involuntary unemployment,
and that a reduction in money wages would have no direct
effect on the level of employment. What is so disturbing
here is not just that Keynes and Modigliani are in conflict,
but that they are in head-on conflict over a fundamental
theoretical question; a question moreover which Modigliani
seems to have settled so decisively in his 1944 article as
to leave no doubts remaining in the minds of most economists
as to the unfelicitous role rigid money wages play in aggregate
economic theory. Of course Keynes wrote The General Theory
well before Modigliani 1 s article appeared, but nevertheless
it is unnerving to find the century's leading economist asserting
so clearly a proposition so directly at odds with what most
economists now believe to be the truth.
Despite the widespread popularity Modigliani'
s
flex price-full employment result now enjoys, this note
will present analyses in support of Keynes's two part con-
tention that (a) rigid money wages are not responsible for
involuntary unemployment, and (b) far from having a baneful
effect on the economy, sticky money wage rates are in fact
a necessary and therefore desirable property of any monetary
system. Our work begins in Section I with a brief sketch
of Modigliani' s classical model of the labor market. After
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laying bare the assumptions and exposing the innerworkings
of his argument, Keynes's objections to the classical theory
of employment are then reviewed in Section II. With this
done, Section III investigates the efficacy of money wage
cuts afresh with the aid of Keynes's own much neglected short
run model of The General Theory ; the model of aggregate supply
and demand developed in Chapter 3 of his book. Finally,
Section IV completes the case against flexible prices with
a brief discussion supporting Keynes's theoretically fun-
damental but largely ignored observation that sticky money
wages are an essential property of money.
I. Modigliani's Model of the Labor Market
The Modigliani analysis of the labor market assumes
competitive behavior, a flexible money wage rate W, and a
flexible price per unit of output P. His model consists
of the usual three equations; one being a labor demand function,
another a labor supply function, and the third a market clearing
equation. Letting N denote the demand and N the supply
of labor, the equations of his system are:
(1) N. » F(W/P), F« < 0.
(2) N « G(W/P), G' > 0.
s
(3) N « N..
s a
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Although equation (3) is familiar to all, it will still
be useful to lay out in some detail the vast network: of
assumptions this simple expression cloaks* Specifically,
to assert equation (3) is to assert the following set of
statements. If:
(3a) N > N , then dW < and dP < 0, with the provision
that |dW/w! > jdP/P| so that d(W/P) < 0. Once
it is assumed that the real wage rate will fall
as a consequence of a decrease in the money wage
rate, equations (1) and (2) guarantee that d(N - N.)
< 0.
(3b) N < N. , then dW > 0, with the provision that
(dW/W) > (dP/P) so that d(W/P) > 0. Equations
(1) and (2) then guarantee that d(Nd - Ng ) < 0.
(3c) N « N,, then dW, dP, d(W/P), and d(N ~ N.) will
s a s a
all be equal to zero.
As we know, the above three equations suffice to determine
a unique full employment equilibrium in the labor market.
If an aggregate production function is added to this set of
equations, then the full employment real output of the system
is determined as well. Once the levels of employment and
real output have been established in this manner, then
Modigliani was able to show that it made no difference whether
one utilized the Keynesian "IS-LM" paraphenalia or the classical
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"M » kY" paraphenalia to determine the remaining variables
of the system such as the price of output, the money wage
rate, national income, consumption, saving and investment,
and the rate of interest. The reason the paraphenalia employed
to solve for the equilibrium values of the remaining variables
makes no difference is because once the above three equations
are accepted, full employment and capacity output rule, and
they rule come what may. In other words, equations (1) through
(3) together with an aggregate production function determine
the employment and real output of the system independently
of whatever set of equations is used to solve for the remaining
variables of the model.
II, Keynes's Critique of the Classical Model of Full
Employment
It was precisely this three equation model of full
employment, and the classical mode of thinking this model
so perfectly exemplifies, which Keynes sought to overthrow
and replace with a theory capable of explaining the actual
levels of employment and real output of the economy. Keynes
catalogued his objections to the classical system of thought
in Chapter 2 of The General Theory , developed his own theory
in Chapters 3 through 21, and took time out in Chapter 19
to argue that a reduction in money wages would have no direct
effect on the actual level of employment.
In his Chapter 2 Keynes accepted the first or labor
demand function of the classical triad. He then went on
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to reject the second or labor supply postulate. However,
Keynes was extremely careful to make it clear that he rejected
this postulate for practical rather than theoretical reasons.
In view of the fact that Keynes produced no compelling objections
to this postulate, we shall accept equation (2) as it stands.
Finally, and most importantly, Keynes rejected the third
postulate of the classical system as being theoretically
unsound. It was Keynes's outright rejection of this postulate—
the classical vision of the workings of the market mechanism--
that enabled him to escape from the full employment fixpoint
prison of classical theory. And it was this escape that made
it possible for Keynes to develop his own more general theory
of employment.
Keynes identified in Chapter 2 what he thought to be
the fatal weakness of the classical market clearing equation.
To grasp what he had in mind, we refer back to (3a) which
states that if involuntary unemployment obtains, then the
money wage rate will fall. So far so good, for if money
wages are assumed to be flexible, then they must fall whenever
labor is involuntarily unemployed. This may not be realistic,
but it is logical, and we are here interested in logic, not
realism. Continuing on with (3a), this postulate assumes
that when the money wage rate falls, the price of output may
or may not fall. But if the price of output does fall, then
it is assumed that the percentage drop in price will be less
than the percentage fall in the money wage rate. However,
to assume this much is to say nothing more than that the
real wage rate will fall with every fall in the money wage
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rate. Given a falling real wage rate, then equations (1)
and (2) promise that the economy will move smartly to full
employment.
Keynes questioned the validity of the classical line
of thought by asking whether a reduction in money wages would
in fact cause real wages to fall. I believe the point Keynes
was attempting to make is that although it may be legitimate
to postulate flexible money wages and prices in a monetary
economy, it is less than legitimate to continue on in this
vein and make the additional assumption that a falling money
wage rate will be followed by a smaller percentage drop in
the price of output. The reason this procedure can be judged
unsound is because it produces by assumption rather than by
analysis the desired conclusion that real wages are flexible
with respect to changes in money wages; and this is far too
cheap a way to come by so important a conclusion. As Keynes
saw it "There may exist no expedient by which labour as a
whole can reduce its real wage to a given figure by making
revised money bargains with entrepreneurs. This will be
our contention. We shall endeavor to show that primarily
it is certain other forces which determine the general level
of real wages. The attempt to elucidate this problem will
be one of our main themes. We shall argue that there has
been a fundamental misunderstanding of how in this respect
the economy in which we live actually works'* [5, p.13].
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III. A Keynesian Analysis of Money Wage Reductions
Although Chapter 2 identified the difficulties afflicting
the classical theory of employment, it was not until Keynes
had erected a considerable theoretical structure of his own
that he was able, in Chapter 19, to answer the two part
question: "(1) Does a reduction in money-wages have a direct
tendency, cet . par . , to increase employment, ' cet . par .
*
being taken to mean that the propensity to consume, the
schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate
of interest are the same as before for the community as a
whole? And (2) does a reduction in money-wages have a certain
or probable tendency to affect employment in a particular
direction through its certain or probable repercussions on
these three factors?" [5, p. 260]. As we know, Keynes concluded
that flexible money wages and prices do not imply flexible
real wages and so he answered both of these questions in
the negative. Indeed, he went so far as to write that "To
suppose a flexible wage policy is a right and proper adjunct
of a system which on the whole is one of laissez-faire t is
the opposite of the truth" [5, p. 2693.
The fact that today many economists do indeed believe
that a system of flexible money wages and prices would
suffice to produce full employment suggests that Keynes's
analysis of this question has enjoyed much less success than
it deserves. Since it is our contention that his argument
is correct, we shall now attempt to clarify Keynes's position
by recasting his treatment of this problem in terms of the

.g-
model of aggregate supply and demand developed in Chapter 3
2
of The General Theory *
To develop Keynes's model we need the following assumptions:
1. X » F(N, K ) is the aggregate production function,
where N denotes the amount of labor employed, and K the
given short run stock of capital equipment. It is supposed
that F is linear homogeneous with F.. positive and FNN negative*
2. Perfect competition prevails in the commodity market.
3. A given money wage rate, W. , obtains to begin with.
Later on, the money wage rate will be reduced in order to
study the effect such a change would have on the equilibrium
level of activity.
Under competitive conditions firms will adjust their
rates of production until short run marginal cost equals
the price of output. Since short run marginal cost is the
money wage rate divided by the marginal product of labor,
We have the following microeconomic condition.
(4) p - (wyF^.
Multiplying both sides of this equation by aggregate output
X, yields the corresponding macroeconomic equilibrium con-
dition.
(5) PX - (W
1
/FN )X.
The term "(W^/F^X 1* states the total receipts firms in the
/

—* 0.
aggregate must receive from the sale of output if they are
to continue production apace. Using the symbol Y to denote
5
these required receipts allows us to write Keynes^ aggregate
supply function as follows.
(6) Y
g
- (W
X
/FN )X.
Since FN is positive and FNN is negative, Ys ^ w i^» tne 9^aPn
of the aggregate supply function belonging to W. f has been
drawn concave to the abscissa in Figure 1.
It is to be noted that the function Y„ does not state
s
the actual receipts firms will in fact receive from the sale
of output, it merely states the receipts required to sustain
any given level of production up to X, , the full employment
output of the system. To determine the actual receipts firms
earn from the sale of output, an aggregate demand function
is needed.
The aggregate demand function, Y,, is defined to be
a relation between real output, X, and the sum of consumer
spending, C, and investment spending, I, measured in dollar
terms. We begin by supposing that consumption in real terms,
c, is a constant proportion, b, of real output. That is
(7) c - bX, < b < 1.
Multiplying the left hand side of (7) by the price of output
and the right hand side by its equilibrium equivalent of

-11-
(-
y =
Vt&)
*~X
Figure 1
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marginal cost, yields the consumption function in money
terms.
(8) PcoCr b(W./F.,)X « bY .
JL N S
As for investment spending, it will be assumed that
3
real Investment is given at some level i . Even so,
investment spending in dollar terms will vary with the level
of output as marginal cost and price vary with output. Thus
(9) I . Pi » (W^/F^i .O 1 N O
The aggregate demand function is then
(10) Y . (w\/FM )(i + bX).a l N o
In Figure 1, Y.tW.), the graph of the aggregate demand function
belonging to W., has been drawn concave to the abscissa too.
Again, this curvature is due to the fact that the price of
output rises along with the level of output.
Equations (6) and (10) together with the condition that
supply equals demand determine the equilibrium value of national
income Y to be (W,/FN )[i /(l - b)], and real output X to
be [i /(l - b)3. Figure 1 illustrates this conclusion and
shows it to be a typical Keynesian equilibrium of less than
full employment; a position in which the commodity market
is both in equilibrium and cleared while the labor market,
though in equilibrium, is not cleared.
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The question now before us is whether the involuntary
unemployment associated with the less than capacity level
of production X is due, as Kodigliani and many others have
asserted, to the rigid money wage rate W., or whether it is
due simply to a lack of effective demand as Keynes would
argue* The answer to this question can be found by postulating
a once over reduction in the money wage rate and observing
the effect this reduction has on the equilibrium level of
activity.
In terms of both equation (6) and the diagram, it is
clear that a reduction in the money wage rate from w. to
W will produce a downward shift in the aggregate supply
function from Y (W.) to Y (W ) as shown in Figure 1. From
s 1 s o
equation (6) it is calculated that the extent of the shift
belonging to any given level of output is
(11) AY » (1/F K,)XAW, where AW » W, - W .S N * 1 O
Now if the aggregate demand function were to remain
in position, then output and employment would rise with every
fall in the money wage rate. However, the aggregate demand
function does not, cannot, remain in place. The reduction
in the money wage rate, and the concomitant fall in the
equilibrium price of output from (W,/FN ) to (w /fm)>
reduces the flow of income belonging to any given level of
output, and so constricts the quantity of finance available
to fuel the economy 1 s spending. Inspection of equation (10)
shows that the downward shift in the spending function,
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from Y,(W.) to Yd ^wQ ^ as displayed in Figure 1, will be
(12) AYd a (l/FN )(iQ + bX)AW.
While equation (11) gives the downward shift in the
aggregate supply function belonging to X to be (1/F.JXAW,
equation (12) states the the corresponding shift in the
demand function to be (1/F..)(i + bX)AW. In view of theN O
fact that X equals (i bX) , it is clear that a reduction
in the money wage rate will shift the two functions by equal
amounts as our diagram shows.
From this analysis it follows that a reduction in the
money wage rate will have no direct effect on the equilibrium
level of output or the volume of employment. Such a reduction
would serve simply to deflate the monetary variables of the
economy while leaving the real variables unchanged. This
proves Keynes's contention that involuntary unemployment
is not due to rigid wages. Rather, involuntary unemployment
is due, as The General Theory taught us, to a lack of effective
demand. In order for the level of activity to rise, real
spending must increase. A change in the numeraire or money
wage rate will not by itself generate any direct increase
in the volume of real spending.
After demonstrating that involuntary unemployment does
not depend on rigid wages and that flexible money wages do
not imply flexible real wages, Keynes went on, in Chapter 19,
to discuss the possible indirect effects that a falling money
wage rate might have on real spending and the level of activity.
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After investigating the uncertain impact such reductions might
have via the redistribution of real income, the rise in
real money balances, the reduction in wage costs relative
to those abroad, the effect on entrepreneurial expectations,
the increased burden of business debt, etc., Keynes concluded
that on balance there is "... no ground for the belief that
a flexible wage policy is capable of maintaining full
employment" [5, p. 267],
Not too many years after The General Theory was published,
4the Pigou effect was adduced to dispose once and for all
"... the Keynesian contention that underemployment- equilibrium
does not depend on the assumption of wage rigidity" [2, p. 119].
Unfortunately for this point of view, Kalecki [4], in an
early response to Pigou' s work, made it clear that the Pigou
effect cannot be used to resuscitate the case for flexible
money wages and prices. He did this by pointing out that a
deflation of the magnitude required for the Pigou effect to
take hold would so disorder the economy as to produce not
full employment but social chaos--a state of affairs which
neither the classical nor Keynesian systems of thought is
capable of analyzing.
h IV. Sticky Money Wages are an Essential Property
of Money
In addition to the analysis given above in support of
the contention that "There may exist no expedient by which
labour as a whole can reduce its real wage to a given figure
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by making revised money bargains with entrepreneurs," Keynes
developed in Chapter 17 of The General Theory a far deeper
and theoretically more significant explanation of why freely
flexible money wages and prices cannot help produce full
employment in a money using economy. In this badly neglected
chapter, Keynes advanced the wholly new and difficult to
accept proposition that sticky money wages (and hence sticky
costs and prices) are an essential property of money * The
extraordinary view he put forward in this chapter was that
money could not function either as a medium of exchange or a
store of value if wage rates, costs of production, and prices
were to rise and fall—frequently and unpredictably—in response
to the randomly intermittent appearances and disappearances
of excess supplies of labor, commodities, and finance that
characterize modern economic systems. Since the utility of
money "... is solely derived from its exchange value'* [5, p.23l],
the services money provide can be rendered "... only if there
is sufficient stability in its purchasing power in buying
the goods that it represents" [6, p.383]. Accordingly,
throughgoing wage and price flexibility of the type envisaged
by many present day economists would destroy a money's
purchasing power, and so render it useless to both the buyers
and sellers of goods and services and to the lenders and
borrowers fo finance. In Lerner's words "Any money which
was completely cured of wage and price rigidity would not
be able to survive as money" [6, p. 385].
The reason a money cannot long survive if its value
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is subject to frequent random variations is that such
fluctuations would destroy its general acceptability. Why
this is so can be seen if we remember that in order of an
object to function as money, it must, at base, be capable
of discharging claims on demand without imposing a capital
loss on either party to a transaction. Thus, sellers will
accept money in return for the goods they supply only if the
dollars they receive have approximately the same value as the
dollars they spent producing output; only if the value of the
dollars they earn match the value of the dollars they have
spent. Viewed this way, the probability of unpredictable
upward movements in the value of money would erode its
acceptability simply because such downward turns in prices
would make it nigh impossible for even the best managed of
firms to cover their recently incurred operating costs out
of current receipts. The resulting inability to relate or
establish a correspondence between the money value of just
suffered operating costs and the money value of current
receipts would thereby expose buyers and sellers to random
capital losses. The possibility of suffering random capital
losses which a system of flexible prices entails would therefore
make it extremely hazardous for the public to conduct their
economic activities in ter-^s of money; in terms of a money
that is unstable at any price, level. Rather "than tolerate
such a dangerously vagarious money, the public would search
for and find, or if necessary invent, a less speculative
surer standard of value and medium of exchange. Slowly
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or quickly, a stable money would be found that would enable
the public to conduct their economic affairs in some rational
fashion in the face of the ordinary day to day risks and
uncertainties inherent in life.
The possibility of sudden upward movements in the price
level would have an equally destructive effect on the acceptability
of money. The practice of specifying in money terms the prices
of goods and services in advance of their delivery, and in
advance of their payment, would expose sellers to the
possibility of suffering capital losses* For example, a
fall in the purchasing power of money between the time wage
rates are agreed upon and labor services delivered, and the
time wages are received and income spent, would break the link
between the value the market places on labor services at the
time wages are determined and the value labor actually receives
for its services. In these circumstances, the practice of
quoting wage rates in straight money terms would soon be abandoned.
More generally, suppliers of goods and services will quote
prices, accept payment, and incur obligations in terms of
money only if there is some close correspondence between the
value of money at the time obligations are made and the time
they are satisfied; between the time income is earned and
income is received and spent, between the time debts are
run up and debts are repaid.
In addition, a money whose value could fall by several
percent in the course of a week, and then could fall again,
or perhaps rise, depending on the current balance between
aggregate supply and demand, would be of little use to
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borrowers and lenders alike. Businesses would cease borrowing
money to finance capital spending simply because in such
circumstances they would not be able to calculate either the
direct money costs of their prospective capital projects or
the expected yield their spending might return. The link
between current capital outlays and prospective yields is highly
tenuous under the best of conditions, but if the value of money
were subject to erratic change, this already fragile nexus
would disappear altogether. Furthermore, few businesses would
be willing to issue debt and commit themselves to making
fixed money payments whose real value would be a random variable.
As for lenders, they would find that stocks, bonds, savings
accounts, pension funds, and just plain cash balances would
no longer be satisfactory stores of value. In a world where
the value of money could flex up and down, money would not
be borrowed, lent, or stored—it would not be used. Instead
of promoting full employment, overall wage and price flexibility
would simply destroy the utility of money.
It has been argued, however, that a flex price system
in which all money wages and all prices rise and fall by
equal percentage amounts would not impair the utility of
money. But surely, no economist who has studied the behavior
of individual prices could accept this contention for the
obvious reason that it is not possible for all prices to
flex simultaneously by equal percentage amounts in any real
economy. Lerner saw this clearly when he wrote "Unless we are
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to suppose away the whole universe we will have different
arrangements in different cases for making the appropriate
abrogations of contracts. We will have different degrees
of the influence of custom in different parts of the economy.
Some prices will tnerefore fall much more than others. There
will be injustice and chaos ... Everything will be in disorder
and nothing predictable—except perhaps one thing: that the
public will not stand for a continuation of such disturbance
and injustice. No matter what else they retain in their
social order they certainly will not retain the monetary
u.iit. It will have been rendered quite unfit to do its main
job" T6, p. 384].
Whe"- we have argued is that in order for money to function
as a stance rd of value and a medium of exchange, the value of
output as a wvole must be sticky in terms of money. But
for the value o." output to be more or less stable in terms of
money, sticky mon.^y wage rates are essential. This is
because the "money wage-rate is a ubiquitous component of th-„
flow-supply prices of commodities and that labor costs are
uniquely related to short-run market prices'' [1, p.319]»
so that "If wages are sticky in terms of money, then the
short-run supply price ...: of output will ••• vary only
with the law of diminishing returns in the short-run, and
changes in productivity in the long run" [l, p.316]. The
money wage rate, then, is the numeraire of the monetary system,
and to have a stable numeraire, sticky money wage rates are
essential. Sticky wage rates imply sticky costs of production
and a relatively stable value of money. With these conditions
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holding, wage contracts will be set in terms of money, costs
calculated, prices determined, short and long term commitments
made, and economic plans drawn up all on the assumption that
a generally acceptable money obtains.
We can now better understand Keynes's observation that
"To suppose a flexible wage policy is a right and proper
adjunct of a system which on the whole is one of laissez-faire
.
is the opposite of the truth." For some decades our monetary
system has been secure from the threat of downward wage and
price flexibility, and this has been all to the good. What
is not all to the good is the fact that society still remains
exposed to the equal danger of rapid upward movements in
money wages and prices. Most recently the economy has suffered
a six year long inflation arising from the federal government's
war spending program. This unhappy experience suggests afresh
that if society is to be protected from inflation, means will
have to be found to limit both the federal government's
willingness and ability to fund and wage large scale socially
destructive programs such as the licentious war in Southeast
Asia. This will not be easy.
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Footnotes
1* The legitimacy of this postulate will be questioned
in Section IV below,
2. It is worth emphasizing that the model developed
in this section is based on Keynes's General Theory rather
than on the now popular IS-LM mechanism Modigliani employed
in his 1944 paper. My reasons for not using the IS-LM
doctrine are that it bears no significant relation to Keynes's
work, and, more importantly, it seems to me to be an internally
inconsistent and therefore unhelpful theory of aggregate
economic behavior.
3. In a previously published paper [10], the author
demonstrated that the rate of investment spending cannot
be determined analytically within the confines of a single
commodity model. Hence our simple assumption is also the
most sensible assumption that can be made.
4. See [8] for. a discussion of the Pigou effect.
5. Aside from Lerner [6], Davidson [l], Robinson [9], .
and Kaldor [33, few economists have taken much interest in
this highly important chapter of The General Theory . To
account for this lack of attention, Davidson has observed
that "Keynes anticipated those 'modern classicists' who aver
that a flexible wage and price structure would automatically
assure full-employment. Keynes' argument on this is simply
devestating~which may explain why so many have chosen to
ignor it* [l, p. 301],
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